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‘For as long as man’s habits and memories and ideals carry forward past patterns, this 
heritage exerts a lasting impress on the subsequent evolution of the social order.’ 
(Sawyer)1 
 
 
Managerial revolutions – which witness the appropriation of corporate power by 
professional managers – come in different shapes and sizes. This article builds upon 
existing critiques of Chandler’s universal theory of the managerial revolution through 
reference to the French national business system, arguing that the concept of the 
managerial revolution is best understood within specific cultural contexts, elite 
ideologies and national business systems. It demonstrates, through the inclusion of 
original data, and a business historical case study, that the French model of capitalism is 
distinguished by continuing links between the state and business, by the density of its 
corporate networks, and the large number of elite actors with experience of working in 
an executive capacity in both the public and private sectors, in stark contrast to the UK.  
 
Keywords: elites; French national business system; managerial revolution; networks; 
state-business relations. 
 
 
Managerial revolutions – which witness the appropriation of corporate power by 
professional managers – come in different shapes and sizes. This article argues that the 
stereotypical ‘managerial revolution’, the term adopted by Chandler as the subtitle to his 
classic text The Visible Hand (1977), and associated with the United States, differs in 
important respects from those of other countries.2 In the case of post-war France, the rise 
of the corporate economy and the flowering of managerialism were not the natural 
products of competitive pressures, but rather of economic and social engineering on the 
part of the ruling elite.3 The article demonstrates, through the inclusion of original data 
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and a business historical case study, which illuminates the essential features of the 
system, that the French model of capitalism has three features that set it apart and are 
fundamental to its modus operandi. The first is the significant participation of the state 
and other companies in the equity of top companies, which brings with it an entitlement 
to representation on the boards. The second is the nexus of relations that exist between 
leading companies in the form of director interlocks. The third is the large number of elite 
actors with direct experience of working in an executive capacity in both the public and 
private sectors, in marked contrast to countries like the UK. In France, the managerial 
class is unified across the public-private divide by common educational experiences and a 
shared ideology of national self-interest. In addition, family ownership remains important 
in France. 
 This article stems from a cross-nationally comparative research project, Business 
Elites and Corporate Governance in France and the UK. The project has been conducted 
by the authors since 1999 and consists of four related sub-projects: first, a study of the 
institutional histories of the top 100 companies in 1998 in France and the UK 
respectively; second, a prosopographical study of the education, qualifications, careers, 
roles and responsibilities of 2,291 directors of the top 100 French and UK companies; 
third, an in-depth study of the social backgrounds and accomplishments of the top 100 
most powerful directors in France and the UK respectively, analysing their social origins 
and career trajectories; and fourth, a study of the social reality of business elites based 
upon a set of semi-structured interviews with past and present business leaders in France 
and the UK.4 A ‘census date’ of 1 January 1998 was selected to ascertain organisational 
and individual membership of the corporate elites of France and the UK. The top 100 
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companies in each country were identified as possessing the greatest amounts of 
‘corporate power’, defined as ‘command over resources’ – financial, physical, human, 
intellectual, social and symbolic (see note to Table 2).5 Membership of the business elite 
was confined to individuals with decisional authority at the summit of top 100 
companies. Data were gathered from a wide range of publicly available sources on each 
of the directors identified as belonging to the business elites of France and the UK in 
1998.  
The article builds upon existing critiques of Chandler’s universal theory of the 
managerial revolution with reference to the French national business system. It draws 
upon several aspects of the research to demonstrate that the concept of the managerial 
revolution is best understood within specific cultural contexts, elite ideologies and 
national business systems. The main point of comparison is the UK. 
 
Managerialism as Ideology and Organisational Imperative 
The transfer of corporate power from owners to professional managers in advanced 
industrial societies has fascinated business historians and economists since the 1930s. 
Ever since companies grew large enough to warrant the appointment of salaried managers 
to run them, bringing about a separation of ownership and control, problems of 
governance potentially have existed. The ‘managerial revolution’ observed by Berle and 
Means in the US in 1929, caused by a growing dispersal in shareholdings, was deemed to 
be incomplete due to the continuing influence exerted in the boardroom by minority 
shareholders, often relatives of founding entrepreneurs.6 As share ownership became 
increasingly dispersed, so, it was argued, would the divorce of ownership and control 
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near completion, allowing managers to act unchecked. Principal-and-agent issues might 
arise, with executives able to substitute their own managerial goals for the profit-
maximising goals of company owners, leading in turn to a potential abuse of power to the 
benefit of managers, no longer acting in the best interests of owners or employees.7   
 The managerial thesis, however, has flaws and limitations, which are well 
documented. Chandler’s research focused essentially on the American industrial 
corporation in the first half of the twentieth century. As Whittington et al. point out, 
Chandler’s framework is fundamentally universalistic and his argument ‘without 
geography’.8 His thesis has been criticised for losing its empirical support in crossing the 
Atlantic without being modified.9 Scale and Scope (1990) went some way towards 
recognising this, examining industrial enterprise in Germany, Britain and the US, and 
distinguishing between their various brands of capitalism, characterised respectively as 
‘cooperative managerial’, ‘personal’ and ‘competitive managerial capitalism’. The 
advantages of American competitive capitalism, however, are emphasised over those of 
the other two models.10 The European visible hand, Hannah observes, is misrepresented 
in Chandler’s ‘distorting mirror’.11  
Moreover, while some commentators regard the Chandlerian model as able to 
withstand the passage of time,12 others take a different view. Langlois argues that 
Chandler’s portrayal of the managerial revolution does not extend well into the present, 
and that the ‘visible hand’ has given way to the ‘vanishing hand’ – driven by 
technological developments and the globalisation of increasingly disembodied markets – 
now in danger of ‘fading into ghostly translucence’.13 Langlois concludes that the 
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managerial revolution applies to a particular moment in time: ‘Far from being a historical 
trend, the managerial revolution … is a temporary episode that arose in a particular era’.  
Lazonick, meanwhile, points to the need to adopt a deeper and broader 
perspective on types of organisational structure by extending the analysis across nations 
and over time ‘to understand new modes of business organisation that generate 
innovation’.14 Europe, after all, has its own traditions of organisational structure, with 
France in particular having a long tradition of state involvement in the economy, dating 
back to Colbert (1619-1683), an enlightened supporter of fledgling industries and 
commerce.15 He lends his name to the long-standing French tradition of state intervention 
in the economy through discriminatory fiscal and public procurement policies, designed 
to favour and protect public and private national champions, and nascent industries, in 
order that they might withstand foreign competition. The principal objective of French 
industrial policy in the post-war period was commercial success in the international 
marketplace through high-tech Colbertism. The state bolstered its ‘national champions’ 
(champions nationaux) in industries perceived to be of the future with grants and public 
procurement measures designed to provide secure markets. The general interest – 
national sovereignty, national defence and technological autonomy – has been 
customarily proffered as justification for what might be termed ‘offensive 
protectionism’.16 
Ownership and control, moreover, are not sharply separated in many companies 
and national business systems. By the 1970s it was being suggested that the separation of 
ownership and control in the US might itself be greatly exaggerated, with the element of 
private ownership of the large majority of firms being disregarded without having been 
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investigated.17 The French and British brands of corporate capitalism have resulted in 
very different ownership patterns. In France, we can observe the continuation down to the 
present of extensive family and state ownership (see Table 1). In the UK, the 
overwhelming tendency has been for ownership to become widely distributed amongst 
multiple shareholders, reflecting the accumulation of private sector savings in the hands 
of pension, insurance and investment companies. These fund holders spread their risks by 
distributing funds widely between companies. In France, this tendency is far less 
pronounced, and in consequence banks, dominant corporations, and powerful individuals 
in effect control large numbers of companies. As Table 1 demonstrates, only 22 of 
France’s top 100 companies in 1998 had a dispersed shareholding, unlike the UK, where 
this was the norm. A slight increase in trend is perhaps apparent however: examining an 
earlier period, 1983-1993, and looking more widely than the top 100 firms, Whittington 
and Mayer found that the proportion of firms under dispersed ownership was 12.2 per 
cent in France in 1983, and just 7.6 per cent in 1993.18 
 
 [Insert Table 1 Ownership of Top 100 Companies in France and the UK in 
1998 about here.] 
 
Since the late 1990s the French economy has undergone significant change, due 
principally to the growing presence of foreign, mainly US, institutional investors in the 
share capital of French firms. By 1998, Maréchal found that non-residents held as much 
as one quarter of the equity of French listed companies.19 Morin estimated the proportion 
of share capital held by foreign investors to be as high as 35 per cent (as against 9 per 
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cent in the UK, and just 5 per cent in the US).20 In his view, France has moved from 
being a “financial network economy” to being a “financial market economy”. Foreign 
institutional investors were now playing a significant role in the French stock market, 
making new demands on corporate management: ‘Directly inspired by the American 
“shareholder value” model, the largest French groups are going through a managerial 
revolution, whose consequences are only now beginning to become apparent’.21 
 
Corporatism and the Evolution of the French National Business System 
In examining the post-war development of the French economy, and the rise of the 
corporate economy in particular, it is important to examine what is distinctive about the 
French economy, French companies and the French national business system. In 
comparing the French and British corporate economies, we have been struck by both 
similarities and differences. From a systemic perspective, it is our contention that 
continuity is more apparent than change. This is not to deny important changes that have 
taken place – in governance, and inward and outward investment, for example, both of 
which have risen dramatically in the post-war era.22 
Family ownership is of enduring significance in France, in stark contrast to the 
near complete corporatism of business life in the UK, and in which ownership and 
control are profoundly separated. While family ownership became gradually less 
important in the post-war period,23 nevertheless by 1998, as Table 1 highlights, it 
continued to dominate in as many as 15 leading French firms. Far from being industrial 
laggards, as Chadeau notes with respect to the interwar years, many large French family-
owned firms have performed well over long periods, successfully reaching out into 
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international markets. As the economy grew, family control was maintained. By using 
alternatives to managerial structures, such as the holding company, families were able to 
‘reconcile expansion with personalised control, without sacrificing efficiency’.24 This 
contradicts the Chandlerian view that efficiency and growth came only when familial 
control yielded to managerial control. Some very large French companies remain family-
dominated to this day, such as Michelin, the former world leader in tyres, and Peugeot-
Citroën SA, one of only six European volume car manufacturers remaining, with several 
family members on its board. Contrary to the logic of the Chandler thesis, there is no 
evidence that companies like Michelin, L’Oréal (Bettencourt family), Sodexho (Bellon 
family) and LVMH (Arnault family) have had their investment and internationalisation 
plans curtailed due to family ownership. L’Oréal, for example, is present in over 130 
countries, with operations in 56, having expanded into the US, Latin America, the Middle 
East, Africa, Asia and the South Pacific. The company has a portfolio of 17 international 
brands, including Lancôme, Maybelline and the Japanese Shu Uemura.25 New 
entrepreneurs have also arrived on the scene, such as Bernard Arnault of LVMH or 
François Pinault of PPR. The type of entrepreneur Arnault exemplifies (of which there 
were as many as nine in our top 100 French super-elite) is intricately associated with the 
establishment. Such entrepreneurs are not compelled to found their own business for 
‘lack of alternative opportunity’, but on the contrary use privilege ‘to create still more 
privilege’.26 At the time of the Popular Front, ‘les 200 familles’ were said to have a 
stranglehold on the French economy. Now the founders of family firms like François de 
Wendel, Paul Ricard and Pierre Taittinger are venerated for their ambition and 
foresight.27 The stocking of boards with family members ensures continuity in 
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management, enabling families such as Peugeot to keep control of their ‘birthright’ in the 
event of an attempted takeover.28 Succession issues, however, may arise, as occurred at 
Michelin in May 2006 with the unexpected death in a boating accident of 42-year-old 
Edouard Michelin, great-grandson of the founder and head of the company.  
In the 1970s, Monjardet observed that the family-controlled enterprise in France 
was characterised by two types of director: the head of the family in 75 per cent of all 
cases, and the ‘faithful servant’, brought up in the company, in the remainder, a ‘trusted 
lieutenant’, on whom the owners relied. It is this role of ‘general’ that Claude Bébéar has 
arguably fulfilled at the insurance company AXA (where he served as CEO and 
Chairman, Président Directeur-Général or PDG, from 1982 to 2000, thereafter as 
Chairman), or Lindsay Owen-Jones at the cosmetic giant L’Oréal (PDG from 1988 to 
2006). Bébéar joined Anciennes Mutuelles, the mutual insurance company that would 
later become AXA, in 1958, the business belonging to the father of his roommate at 
Ecole Polytechnique, who was looking for someone to manage it. Over four decades, 
through several metamorphoses, and making numerous acquisitions along the way 
(including that of Union des Assurances de Paris in 1996), Bébéar helped to turn the 
struggling provincial insurer from Normandy into a world leader.  
Similarly, Owen-Jones proved himself over the years to be a skilful captain of the 
L’Oréal ship. Trusted implicitly by the Bettencourt family, he has been well rewarded for 
his achievements, believed to be France’s top-earning executive in 2003. L’Oréal’s 
success confirms the conclusions of a recent study by the Ecole des Mines, according to 
which a combination of family ownership and professional management provides the best 
corporate model for France, ‘uniting wisdom and dynamism’.29 In such cases, the owner 
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may well be absent from the nominal direction of the firm; but this does not mean to say 
that their ownership has been diluted. Liliane Bettencourt provides an example of the 
enduring nature of family control in leading French firms. She is the daughter of Eugène 
Schueller, a French chemist and engineer who developed a formula for hair dye and, in 
1907, founded L’Oréal. Madame Bettencourt holds a controlling stake in the company of 
27.5 per cent of equity. Now in her eighties, she still attends board meetings, often 
accompanied by her daughter, also a board member. With a fortune estimated at $17.2 
billion in 2005, she is believed to be France’s richest person, and the 16th richest in the 
world.30 L’Oréal was run by its founder until 1957, when the reins were handed to 
François Dalle, credited with transforming the firm from one of France’s PME (petites et 
moyennes enterprises or small and medium-sized businesses) into one of the largest 
cosmetic companies in the world.31 Dalle had attended school in Paris32 with the future 
president François Mitterrand and future Cabinet minister André Bettencourt, who 
introduced Dalle to Schueller (whose daughter, Liliane, Bettencourt married), illustrative 
of the fact that the friendships that unite the French ruling elite are often forged on school 
benches. Dalle continued as PDG of L’Oréal until 1984. 
Our research has established that the French and British top 100 companies in 
1998 were collectively of approximately the same size (in terms of turnover, employment 
and total capital employed).33 These surface similarities, however, belie deeper structural 
differences. Table 2 highlights some of the major differences and similarities that exist in 
the developmental trajectories of the French and British corporate economies. 
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[Insert Table 2 Corporate Power by Industry Group amongst Top 100 
French and UK Companies in 1998 about here.] 
 
The most obvious difference is the contrast between the relative weights of the 
manufacturing and financial services sectors. In France, a combination of state support 
and private sector initiative, underpinned by extensive investment in the education of 
engineers, have secured the future for manufacturing industry, whereas in the UK 
manufacturing and manufacturing companies have suffered a long period of relative 
decline in terms of status, investment, output and employment. Financial services, 
meanwhile, have become ever more prominent in the UK, and, while important in 
France, the sector has never exerted the same dominating influence that it has across the 
Channel.34 Utilities and telecommunications are also heavily weighted in France relative 
to Britain, reflecting continued protectionism and other forms of support for such 
companies in France, whereas British companies have been far more exposed to 
international competition.35 Other interesting contrasts include the importance of 
consumer goods producers and food and drink conglomerates within the UK corporate 
economy, as well as the strength nationally and internationally of French retailing 
companies. One of the most interesting similarities is the high weighting of extractive 
(including oil and gas) and materials handling companies in both countries. 
 
[Insert Table 3 Concentration of Power Amongst Top 100 Companies in 
France and the UK in 1998 about here.] 
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A further differentiating feature between the two economies concerns the extent 
of concentration in the two economies. The pursuit of economies of scale, of critical 
mass, has been a feature of both French and British economic development since 1945, 
with consolidation taking place in a series of waves, increasingly on a pan-European and 
international basis. The effect has been to concentrate power in the hands of the very 
largest companies. Table 3 charts the distribution of corporate power amongst the top 100 
companies in France and the UK respectively. There are two main findings. First, 
concentration is marked in both economies, with the top five, ten and twenty companies 
each possessing multiples of the mean amount of power. Second, concentration is, 
however, more marked in France, as can be seen from the percentage distributions and 
confirmed by the relative sizes of concentration coefficients. By the end of the twentieth 
century, and notwithstanding the extent of family ownership and state involvement in the 
economy, France had nevertheless become in many respects a corporate economy par 
excellence. 
 
Managerialism and the Ruling Elite: the Case of Electricité de France 
The case of Electricité de France (EdF) demonstrates continuity in French policy, and 
usefully highlights the essential features of the system. These include strategic initiatives 
driven by the ruling elite; long-term thinking on a large-scale fuelled by the dual 
imperatives of national energy security and the saving of foreign exchange; technological 
and capital intensity; internationalisation; and the French ‘take’ on managerialism and 
corporate hierarchies. EdF provides an excellent illustration of the kind of state support 
from which French utilities typically benefit, their pan-European and global strategies 
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being supported at home by closed and quasi-monopolistic markets, often in direct 
contravention of European Union (EU) directives. Table 1 highlights the continuing 
importance of state ownership in 1998, despite more than a decade of privatisation, which 
began in France in 1986. Table 2 points to the incommensurate hold on power of French 
utilities relative to their number, just six utility firms representing almost 20 per cent of 
corporate power in 1998. 
 EdF was born in the immediate aftermath of the war, in April 1946, with the 
amalgamation and nationalisation of French utility companies. Guaranteed nationwide 
energy supplies were seen as quintessential to economic recovery and prosperity. As 
General de Gaulle explained, ‘the country’s activity depended on coal, electricity, gas 
and petroleum, and would eventually depend on atomic fission and in order to bring 
France’s economy to the level that progress demanded these resources must be developed 
on the largest possible scale. Expenditure and efforts were necessary, therefore, which 
only the state was in a position to realize and nationalization was a necessity.’36 
The decision to develop nuclear power was taken in 1955. But little was done, and 
the subsequent fall in the price of oil in the 1960s initially cast doubt on the wisdom of a 
nuclear programme, until the Yom Kippur War of 1973 strengthened government 
resolve. In March 1974, it was decided to begin construction of six nuclear energy plants 
that year and a further seven in 1975. These were built with great speed. In the UK, the 
development of nuclear energy attracted widespread public protest, epitomised by the 
high-profile demonstration at Windscale (later renamed Sellafield). In France, however, 
the nuclear programme met with limited resistance, greeted by general public acceptance 
of the need for a secure national energy supply. Indeed, it was a source of national pride 
 14 
when, in the early 1980s, France became self-sufficient in electricity thanks to the nuclear 
programme, and began exporting electricity to other countries, including by the mid-
1980s oil-rich Britain. When, following the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, other European 
countries scaled down or halted their nuclear plant construction programmes, the French 
actually speeded up construction. EdF promoted nuclear energy at the time in a televised 
advertisement featuring a sole pair of ballroom dancers surrounded by fighting pairs of 
boxers in a ring, confirming French ease at doing things differently. 
French electricity production expanded considerably in the 1980s, such that 
production in 1998 was almost twice its 1980 level. Electricity production benefited from 
the huge cost reductions derived from cheap nuclear energy, confirming the financial 
wisdom of France’s heavy investment in nuclear power in the 1970s and 1980s (if not its 
environmental sense). In the 1980s, France overtook Japan and the former USSR to 
become the world’s second largest producer of electricity generated from nuclear energy, 
behind only the US.37 In 1998 almost half (46 per cent) of nuclear-generated electricity in 
the EU was produced by France’s network of 58 nuclear plants, with EdF producing 
some 76 per cent of its energy from nuclear power stations.38 
Self-sufficiency in energy is a prodigious achievement for a country with little gas 
and almost no oil. The pursuit and ultimate achievement of self-sufficiency was the 
French reaction to the oil crisis, which 25 years previously had sent the country reeling 
into a decade-long recession. The contrast with the UK, which has benefited since 1975 
from North Sea oil, now beginning to run out, is salient. With self-sufficiency in energy 
acquired, EdF and its fellow state monopoly, Gaz de France (GdF), set about capturing 
international markets through export and acquisition.39 In doing so, they benefited from 
 15 
state ownership coupled with closed, de facto monopolistic markets at home. This 
protected position allowed them to take full advantage of market liberalisation elsewhere 
in the EU with relative impunity, to the bitter resentment of energy producers in 
neighbouring EU member states, such as Germany, Spain and the UK.40  
In 1996, Edmond Alphandéry, the newly appointed PDG (following a two-year 
period as Minister of the Economy), addressed a conference celebrating the fiftieth 
anniversary of EdF at La Villette. The energy supplier, he vowed, would remain in the 
public sector. His discourse was redolent of cultural continuity, echoing the sentiments of 
de Gaulle in nationalising the utility 50 years previously: ‘EDF identified almost 
perfectly with the spirit of the Liberation and the Reconstruction … Fifty years after its 
birth, EDF is more than ever the instrument of the nation.’41 
That same year the EU electricity directive on market liberalisation took effect, in 
response to which other EU member states broke up their electricity industries. France, 
however, did not. EdF embarked on a strategy of international expansion, acquiring 
assets (power stations and physical interconnectors) in the EU as well as customers 
(supply businesses). Its primary European export markets included Germany, Italy, 
Spain, Belgium, Switzerland, Andorra and the UK. Further afield it supplied a growing 
customer base in Asia, Africa and South America; altogether it supplied some 15 million 
customers outside France in 1998. By then, EdF had become the second largest electricity 
producer in the world, possessing the greatest export capacity of any EU electricity 
generator, while the domestic electricity market remained the least open in the EU. As a 
public-sector monopoly, EdF benefited from the tutelage of the state, including financial 
support and credit guarantees.42 The cost of capital advantage derived by EdF from state 
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ownership should not be underestimated. EdF has been able to raise money for 
acquisitions at a rate of interest lower than government bond rates, while its private-
sector European competitors, such as British Energy, could do no better than central bank 
base rates. EdF’s assets include, in the UK, London Electricity and SWEB, as well as 
generation assets such as Sutton Bridge power station. It has purchased the rights to 
control the flows of electricity throughout continental Europe, successfully buying up the 
interconnectors that link France to the UK, France to Spain, and so on.43 It has also 
acquired the interconnectors that join continental Europe to external electricity systems 
such as Eastern Europe and the Nordic countries.  
In short, EdF has used government finance terms to acquire assets abroad, 
engaging in a strategy of state-funded international expansion. It has been operating for 
the past decade in commercial spheres, but not on commercial terms, being (until 
November 2005) without shareholders to satisfy. Its expansion abroad has been supported 
by protection at home, coupled with unrivalled access to low cost capital. It is a 
formidable combination and a unique source of competitive advantage. French 
attachment to protectionism within the energy sectors stands in flagrant contradiction to 
its economic aspirations for European construction. As Alain Vernholes observes, ‘It is 
incoherent to rejoice that a firm such as EdF should control a large part of electricity 
distribution in London while refusing – or deferring – reciprocity on national territory on 
the pretext of protecting the general interest which depends on a public monopoly’.44 
French interpretation of EU legislation on the liberalisation of energy markets has been 
belated and minimalist. The partial privatisation of EdF in October/November 2005 is 
unlikely to appease the group’s critics. The stake sold off was small, just 15 per cent. 
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Ironically, the motivation behind the sell-off was the need to raise a further 7 billion 
euros to finance EdF’s continuing expansion in Europe.45 
This state-sponsored strategy has proved highly effective for manipulating the 
rules of the game, highlighting two of the key characteristics of French capitalism. These 
are, first, the readiness of the state and ruling elite to manage the competitive landscape 
in favour of French firms;46 and second, the elite cohesion which serves the collective 
interests of French business, and which is institutionally embedded and served, in turn, by 
the state.47  
 
Social Stratification and the Making of the French Managerial Class 
The ways in which managerial hierarchies are established in France very much reflect 
other social processes that endorse social stratification and status distinctions. Education, 
in particular, mirrors the situation in business organisations and government departments. 
It is the basis of ideological coherence amongst French managerial, business and ruling 
elites, explaining the closeness of the ties between big business and the state, amply 
illustrated by the EdF case. Table 4 provides a summation of the educational backgrounds 
and career experiences of the French managerial class, compiled from data relating to 
main board level executive directors of top 100 companies in France and the UK in 1998. 
 
[Insert Table 4 The Managerial Elites of France and the UK in 1998 about here.] 
 
Table 4 reveals that the leading executive directors in both countries in 1998 were 
predominantly males born in the 1940s and 1950s, who were born and bred in the country 
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in which their company was domiciled. Few women or foreigners rose to the very top of 
these companies. The table highlights very striking differences in terms of the 
educational backgrounds between the two cohorts in 1998. Members of the French 
managerial elite were mainly educated in a select group of schools and higher education 
institutions, elite coherence being fostered by the likelihood of their having attended the 
same schools. Particularly influential were three Parisian lycées: Louis-le-Grand, Janson-
de-Sailly and Saint-Louis. Nine out of the top ten schools, attended by 44.5 per cent of 
the cohort, are clustered in the Paris basin. There is some concentration in the UK but 
nowhere to the same degree (16.4 per cent). The French, moreover, were typically 
educated for longer and at a higher level than their British counterparts, often at a leading 
grande école, the Ecole Polytechnique, the Institut des Sciences Politiques de Paris 
(Sciences-Po) and the Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA) being especially prized. 
More than half of the French cohort (54.9 per cent) attended one of the top five higher 
education institutions, as against 39 per cent in the UK. The added value of the grandes 
écoles derives from the rigour of their selection process. They are endowed with a 
disciplinary ethos; Polytechnique, for example, was established by Napoleon in 1794, and 
falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence, not Education.48 Again, nine out of 
the top ten institutions of higher education favoured by the elite are in the Paris basin. 
This concentration of elite establishments in Paris and its surrounding area is 
extraordinary. Though it may have led in the past to accusations of a two-tier nation,49 the 
domination of the capital has itself played a critical role in fostering strong ties among the 
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French business elite, being home to the best schools and higher education institutions, 
the key organs of government and the headquarters of most leading companies. 
For students who excel, attendance at a grande école may be followed by the 
invitation to join one of the civil service grand corps, such as the Inspection des 
Finances, the Corps des Mines or the Corps des Ponts et Chaussées. These serve as 
funnels to channel the cream of the grandes écoles to the top jobs, playing a pivotal role 
in the selection and education of the elite in the business, administrative, political and 
military domains.50 They function as a sort of extended family, encouraging an esprit de 
caste, again strengthening the tight-knit ties amongst the ruling elite.   
Regarding the mix of career experience that best fits people out for elevation to 
the uppermost echelons of management, by far the largest part of the elite was drawn in 
both countries from within the ranks of career corporate executives. A significant 
minority in France, however, was drawn from the pool of individuals with high-level 
experience in public administration (16.6 per cent), a phenomenon almost unknown in the 
UK, exemplifying the strong links between the state and business in France. A relatively 
small proportion of UK elite members had a professional background of some kind, far 
more than in France. The managerial context in which individual careers were forged was 
far more diverse in France than in the UK, reflecting the continued significance of the 
state, families and co-operatives in the corporate world. 
Finally, Table 4 shows that a large majority of members of the managerial elite in 
both countries have very little leadership experience beyond the confines of their own 
enterprise. In the UK, the practice is for one and occasionally two non-executive 
directorships to be permitted for senior directors towards the end of their managerial 
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career. In France, the situation is very similar apart from members of the ‘super-elite’, the 
elite within the elite, the PDG of the very largest companies. These individuals typically 
hold multiple non-executive directorships, forming a bridge between the top teams of the 
most powerful French companies (see Table 5, below). 
 
Corporate Networks and Institutional Cohesion 
The ideological coherence fostered by the French system of elite recruitment, outlined 
above, ensures that the ruling elite is composed of like-minded individuals, capable of 
concerted action. Moreover, the central role of the state in this education needs to be 
underscored. The top lycées mentioned above are state schools, not independent ‘public’ 
schools, as in the UK. The grandes écoles were created by the state, and serve the state, 
as do the grands corps. The state is central to the selection process.51 The brightest 
students who have successfully made it through the grandes écoles repay their ‘debt’ to 
the state by working for it for a number of years in some capacity, perhaps at the 
Treasury, or in a ministerial cabinet, before moving on, as many of them do, to the world 
of business. As Roger Fauroux, a former director of ENA and a former Minister of 
Industry, puts it: ‘French organizations are run by the nation’s star pupils’.52 
An essential element of the training experienced by gifted individuals at elite 
establishments, however, is not just the acquisition of competence but, equally, the 
acquisition of connections.53 Managerialism has indeed triumphed in France.54 The 
conversion of the socialist government to the market economy in the mid-1980s in 
particular had profound consequences for the reconstitution of French capitalism, 
engendering a new confidence and greater cohesiveness on the part of the managerial 
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elite. While some commentators suggest that the power relationship between the state and 
firms may have reversed since then, and that large firms may have used government 
policies to support their own adjustment and advancement,55 our position is rather that 
this is the product of having a unified elite, rather than large firms per se, increasingly 
calling the shots. The products of the grands corps d’état, ‘les corpsards’, for example, 
are able to exchange positions in government, politics and business in the domain that is 
controlled by their particular corps. Thus, given that the Corps des Mines controls the 
domain of nuclear energy, it is students of the Ecole des Mines that occupy the top 
positions in the nuclear energy industry. Anne Lauvergeon, the current PDG of the 
nuclear engineering company Areva, is a graduate of the Ecole des Mines. Her previous 
positions include Deputy Chief of Staff at the French Presidency under Mitterrand and 
CEO of the nuclear fuel cycle specialist Cogema. Members of the Corps des Mines 
control the political positions where critical decisions are taken regarding nuclear energy; 
as Groenewegen explains, ‘When someone changes jobs, then automatically another 
member of the same corps takes his or her place’.56 The institutional nature of the ties 
that bind the French business elite together is historically determined, French business 
leaders having a long-standing preference, as Cassis and Bussière observe, for institutions 
over markets.57 Despite the triumph of managerialism in France, there is a strong sense in 
which this preference endures. 
Table 5 examines the known career and educational profiles of the CEOs of the 
top 100 companies in France in 1998. Here, company size is cross-referenced with 
various features of the managerial elite by focusing exclusively on the super-elite at the 
very summit of France’s leading corporations. The table provides some evidence to 
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suggest that the CEOs of the most powerful companies are more likely to have benefited 
from an elite education. Notably, those attending ENA are clustered in the very largest, 
top 25, enterprises. The vast majority of CEOs, whatever the size of company, are 
educated in the sciences and engineering, or economics and business, or in both 
disciplinary fields (86.9 per cent). The French have a low tolerance for the arts, 
humanities and social sciences. This is in marked contrast to the UK, where students, 
even high-flying ones, often shun engineering courses in preference for the humanities, 
such that major engineering companies – Airbus UK, for example – increasingly have to 
seek engineering graduates abroad to meet their needs.58 
The pursuit of critical mass, the conviction that size matters, has characterised 
both French and British economic development in the post-war period. Table 5 turns the 
spotlight on the CEOs of the largest companies, the super-elite, suggesting that they are 
indeed more likely to have particular career trajectories. The rule would seem to hold 
good that the larger the company, the more likely that the CEO will have a background in 
public administration – this applies to almost one half (48 per cent) of CEOs of the top 25 
companies. This correlates with the appointment of ENA graduates to CEO positions 
within many top 25 companies. In addition, four CEOs of top 100 companies have come 
directly from the world of politics. These include Edmond Alphandéry of EdF, who 
served as Minister of the Economy (1993-1995) before becoming PDG of the energy 
group. Movement from the top echelons of business to politics is also possible. Francis 
Mer went from being PDG of the steel group Arcelor (a position he had held since 1986 
as head of Usinor, which merged in 2002 with Aceralia and Arbed to form the new 
group) to Minister of the Economy, Finance and Industry (2002-2004). Table 5 confirms, 
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moreover, that the CEOs of largest companies are more likely than others to hold 
multiple directorships at the pinnacle of French business, with almost one-third (32 per 
cent) of CEOs of all top 100 companies serving as a non-executive director of two or 
more top 100 companies, as against more than two-thirds (68 per cent) of CEOs of the 
top 25 companies. Our research suggests that the density of directorial interlocks in 
France is almost double that in the UK.59 In short, this table highlights the importance of 
corporate networks for French business, throwing into critical relief the institutional 
nature of elite cohesion in France, characterised in particular by strong links between 
business and the state. 
 
Conclusion: the Enduring Particularities of the Managerial Revolution in France 
This article confirms the limitations of universal theories of the managerial revolution. As 
Penrose states, ‘universal truths without reference to time and space are unlikely to 
characterise economic affairs’.60 That said, the intellectual climate in which Chandler 
began was one in which it was generally believed that industrial economies would 
eventually converge on the American model.61 We propose here an alternative approach 
that recognises the economic and social realities of different national business systems. 
The French model of capitalism is marked by enduring links between the state and 
business, by the close-knit nature of its corporate networks, and the sizeable number of 
elite members with experience of working in an executive capacity in both the public and 
private sectors, unlike the UK. The state, in the words of Fridenson, has a ‘pivotal place 
… in a society of ranks’, whose managerial elites ‘have yet to complete their 
emancipation from the nation’s government’.62 This is in spite of 20 years of 
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privatisation, 50 years of closer European integration, and the arrival in France in the late 
1990s of international institutional investors, bringing new techniques and demands on 
corporate management.63 All of these, admittedly, have altered the French corporate 
economy in different ways, but without, arguably, changing its essential core. Family 
ownership, too, remains highly significant in France, even amongst the largest 
companies, with a significant proportion of elite managers having had some personal 
route to the top – another marked contrast to the UK.64  
Our research suggests that cultural reproduction serves as a source of continuity 
and distinctiveness. This has important implications for France and the French capitalist 
model. Education is a powerful instrument of cultural reproduction. It is the basis of 
ideological coherence amongst the managerial, business and ruling elites, engendering a 
common mindset. This enables elite circulation among the fields of business, government 
and the civil service, bolstering solidarity amongst the ruling elite. Managerialism in 
France has embraced this mindset, which remains heroically wedded to the general 
interest, convinced that companies such as EdF can still serve as the ‘instrument of the 
nation’.65 Members of the managerial and political classes have been the architects of 
France’s post-war economic recovery, and also the beneficiaries.66 Despite 
Europeanisation, and globalisation, bringing undeniable change in governance practices 
and investment patterns, establishment solidarity, self-serving, and sustained and 
supported by the state, arguably remains as powerful a force at the heart of the French 
corporate economy as ever it was. 
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Table 1 
Ownership of Top 100 Companies in France and the UK in 1998 
 
 France UK 
Ownership No. No. 
   
Public company with dispersed shareholding  22  95 
Public company with concentrated shareholding  42  5 
Dominant family shareholding  15  0 
Dominant state shareholding  15  0 
Co-operative or other enterprise  6  0 
   
 
Note: A company with a dispersed shareholding is defined as no single shareholder or 
shareholder group holding 20 per cent or more of equity. A single shareholder or 
shareholder group holding 20 per cent or more of equity defines a company with a 
concentrated shareholding.  A dominant family or state holding is 20 per cent or more of 
equity. 
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Table 2 
Corporate Power by Industry Group amongst Top 100 French and UK Companies in 1998 
 
 France UK 
Industry Group No. of 
Companies 
% Share of 
Corporate 
Power 
No. of 
Companies 
% Share of 
Corporate 
Power 
     
Construction  3  2.0  0  0.00 
Financial services  2  4.9  19  23.5 
Food and drink  12  4.5  10  8.6 
IT and business services  6  1.5  3  1.8 
Manufacturing  28  26.9  15  13.5 
Media, consumer services 
and products 
  
 9 
 
 6.7 
  
 11 
 
 9.9 
Oil and gas, mining and 
materials 
  
 14 
 
 13.4 
  
 9 
 
 16.6 
Retailing  15  14.7  11  9.9 
Transport and distribution 
services 
  
 5 
 
 5.5 
 
 7 
 
 4.7 
Utilities and 
telecommunications 
  
 6 
 
 19.9 
 
 15 
 
 11.5 
     
 
Note: A power score was calculated for each company based upon equally weighted 
values for total capital employed, turnover, net profit and number of employees. Each 
company was then assigned to a single industry group wherein power scores were 
combined and percentage shares of total corporate power calculated. 
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Table 3 
Concentration of Power Amongst Top 100 Companies in France and the UK in 1998  
 
Share of Combined Power of 
Top 100 Companies 
France  
(%) 
UK  
(%)  
   
Top 5 companies . 22.3  20.4 
Top 10 companies  37.3  31.0 
Top 20 companies  58.4  46.7 
Top 50 companies  87.1  76.7 
   
All 100 companies  100.0  100.0 
Coefficient of concentration  0.02250  0.01759 
   
 
Notes:  The procedures for the determination of corporate power are defined in the 
note to Table 2. The coefficient of concentration, C, combines in a single measure the 
two main components of the concept of concentration: the number of firms in the sample 
and the inequality of the distribution of their size. This particular measure is known as the 
Herfindahl Index of Concentration, and as applied here uses the coefficient of variation of 
power as a measure of inequality. The coefficient of variation of power equals the 
standard deviation of corporate power for the top 100 companies divided by the mean 
power score, and C is calculated as follows: 
  C = (1 / N) (1 + CV2) 
 Where CV = coefficient of variation and N = 100. 
If power were divided equally between the Top 100 companies in either France or the 
UK, then C would equal 0.01 – the reciprocal of the number of firms in the sample. The 
more unequally power is distributed, the higher C becomes. 
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Table 4 
The Managerial Elites of France and the UK in 1998 
 
Group Characteristics France UK 
   
Demographics   
 Number 554  588 
 % French nationals 89.7  1.4 
 % UK nationals 1.8  86.7 
 % Men 96.8  98.5 
 % Women 3.2  1.5 
 Mean age 51.9  52.3 
   
Education   
% of known attendances at top 20 school  53.2  25.6 
 % of known attendances at top 10 school  44.5  16.4 
 % of known attendances at top 5 school   34.7  15.5 
 % of known attendances at elite HE institution  82.1  68.0 
 % of known attendances at top 5 elite HE institution  54.9  39.0 
 Holders of HE qualifications above first degree as % of 
subjects with known educational backgrounds 
 90.3  38.1 
   
Career experience   
 % corporate only  81.5  88.5 
 % public administration and corporate  16.6  1.7 
 % politics and corporate  0.4  1.0 
 % professional and corporate  1.0  7.9 
 % academic and corporate  0.5  0.9 
   
Managerial context   
 % in managerially controlled enterprises  64.5  100.0 
 % in state controlled enterprises  18.2  0.0 
 % in family controlled enterprises  12.9  0.0 
 % in cooperative enterprises  4.4  0.0 
   
Career type   
 % executive only  84.1  80.4 
 % executive + 1 other top 100 non-executive 
directorship 
 8.6  13.7 
% executive + 2 or more other top 100 non-executive 
directorships 
 7.3  5.9 
   
 
Note:  This table relates to the entire population of main board members (or equivalent 
in the French case) holding executive roles in top 100 French and UK companies.  
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Table 5 
Known Career and Educational Profiles of the Chief Executive Officers of the Top 100 
Companies in France in 1998 
 
 All  Companies Ranked by Size 
Profile Companies 1-25 26-50 51-75 76-100 
      
Attendance at Educational Institutions      
% of known attendances at top 20 school  62.3 68.4 68.4 61.1 46.2 
% of known attendances at top 10 HE 
institution 
82.9 81.0  90.5 81.0 66.7 
% of known attendances at Ecole 
National d’Administration 
22.4 38.1 14.3 21.1 13.3  
      
Higher Education Type      
% engineering & science  24.7 27.2 30.5 30.0 13.3 
% economics & business  37.5 36.4 30.4 30.0 56.3 
% both engineering & science and 
economics & business 
 24.7 27.3 21.7 30.0 11.7 
% other subjects  13.1 8.1 17.4 10.0 18.7 
      
Career Profile      
% corporate  63.0  48.0  68.0  60.0  76.0 
% public administration and corporate  27.0  48.0  24.0  36.0  0.0 
% enterprise and corporate  4.0  4.0  8.0  0.0  4.0 
% politics and corporate  4.0  0.0  0.0  4.0  12.0 
% academia and corporate  2.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  8.0 
      
Director Roles      
% also chairman 73.0 72.0 80.0 76.0 64.0 
% also non-executive of 1 other top 100 
company 
17.0 12.0 24.0 24.0 8.0 
% also non-executive of 2 or more other 
top 100 companies 
32.0 68.0 24.0 24.0 12.0 
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